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Background 
Albeit dating from 19993, the cyber threat known as botnets has successfully adapted against 
countermeasures and ranked once again among the top cybersecurity concerns last year.4 According 
to the explanatory memorandum of the Directive on attacks against information systems, botnets are 
“networks of computers that have been infected by malicious software”. The combined power of all the 
individual infected computers (also known as zombies) through dedicated or dispersed command and 
control (C&C) structures is used by perpetrators to inter alia send out spam or execute distributed denial 
of service (DDoS) attacks. 
While the threat has been recognised by most key stakeholders, botnet takedowns remain a very 
considerable challenge. Botmasters operate on a global scale, while government officials and even 
private companies need to pay due regard to jurisdiction issues. Furthermore, botnet technologies 
appear to evolve rapidly into structures that are very persistent and thus hard to disrupt. They are now 
increasingly decentralized networks operating via peer-to-peer (P2P) technologies,5 where the C&C is 
spread among compromised machines. Because P2P bots do not receive orders from a singular C&C, 
but rather from other distributed bots, the botmaster may not be individually targeted or identified6. The 
change from central C&Cs to P2P fluid architecture without single point of failure strengthened botnet 
resilience and stability7 against takedown and disruption attempts, while making detection even harder8. 
Contrary to what its name suggests, this advanced form of botnet is growing outside the limits of P2P 
networks and combining other infection means9 such as email, mobile communications and cloud 
computing to recruit zombies. Only just recently a consortium consisting of Microsoft, Europol (EC3) and 
the FBI tried to take down the widely-spread ZeroAccess botnet10, but were only partially successful. 
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The case did demonstrate, however, how international cooperation between law enforcement authorities 
and private actors is crucial in the takedown of botnets. 
To fight this emerging threat, specific mitigation tools have been studied and deployed by security 
experts. These include index poisoning11, Sybil-attacks12, bare-metal13, crawling14. Apart from the 
examination of the efficiency of such tools, law enforcement authorities (LEAs) and their private sector 
partners are faced with the challenge of whether these are legitimate means to gather intelligence about 
botnets and disrupt their operations.  
Research aim, questions and methodology 
The rise of P2P botnets and the need for effective countermeasures has revealed a lack of legal backing 
in the use of mitigation techniques. We aim to bridge this gap by examining whether popular P2P botnet 
mitigation tools classify as legitimate means to fight cybercrime in light of the applicable European 
framework.  
From a legal perspective, the first questions arise with regard to data protection law. The zombie state 
is often unknown to the user of the machine and mitigation techniques operated by private actors are 
likely to interfere with their private communications as well as to access personal information and other 
types of protected data. In fact, the operations envisioned by many anti-cybercrime tools fall within the 
scope of the Data Protection Directive and e-Privacy Directive. In this context, we will be looking at the 
information flows, categories of processed data and legitimating grounds used by private sector in their 
fight against botnets. To this end, selected anti-botnet solutions will be scrutinized under the European 
data protection framework, implementing national laws, and related jurisprudence.  
Additional questions are brought from a criminal procedural law point of view, as it is rather unclear 
whether gathering evidence through such tools will be upheld in court. From this angle, our research will 
focus on the question of how law enforcement authorities can access, search and seize material possibly 
to be used as evidence in ensuing legal proceedings. Starting out from the relevant provisions in the 
Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime and the recently introduced Directive on attacks against 
information systems, we will look particularly into the national powers for LEAs to access, search and 
seize to see whether they are up to task of dealing with botnet takedown techniques.  
To answer all these questions, we have narrowed our analysis down to selected countries, namely 
Belgium, the UK, the Netherlands and Spain. While the first have granted far-reaching investigative 
powers to their law enforcement agents for tackling cybercrime, the Netherlands has undertaken 
significant efforts to fight botnets by creating a specialised high-tech police unit and participated in the 
prosecution of the ZeroAcess botnet disruption. Furthermore, the latter jurisdiction has recently 
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introduced a proposal for a new law extending the powers of law enforcement officials in dealing with 
cybercrime quite considerably. Spanish authorities have also played an interesting role in cooperating 
with the private sector to takedown P2P botnets.15 Each of these jurisdictions has created or is in the 
process of creating a national legal framework that to some extent can cope with the cross-border issues 
which one might expect when taking down a botnet. Finally, all countries are recognised for their defence 
of the right to privacy and stringent data protection legislation.  
First, we will reach out to key stakeholders involved in the fight against botnets. Information will be 
gathered from interviews with contacts at EUROPOL (EC3), national CERTs, law enforcement 
authorities, research institutes (TU Delft, IViR, Oii and KU Leuven), and private sector (Microsoft). This 
step will serve to select a sample of the most common mitigation tools used by law enforcement, private 
sector and research institutes, gather information about the operation and deployment of solutions, and 
rank techniques according to their relevance, adequacy and purpose. An in-depth desk research and 
literature review on the functioning and deployment of the sample will follow. 
Later, the deployment of P2P botnet solution will be confronted with the legal requirements enshrined 
by the applicable European framework, national laws and court rulings of Belgium, UK, the Netherlands 
and Spain. This will lead to a conclusive assessment of the legal requirements imposed to the use and 
development of P2P botnet solutions and result in recommendations for the appropriate deployment of 
such techniques by law enforcement and private sector. 
At this stage, possible outcomes include findings on the illegitimate character of some of the sampled 
solutions as well as inadequacies in the existing national legal frameworks in dealing with the botnet 
threat. This can be due to: 1. inobservance of national data protection standards by private actors; 2. 
absence of clear powers given to LEAs to deploy invasive anti-botnet techniques; and 3. obstacles to 
the use by law enforcement of illegally collected evidence by a third party. Finally, the comparative 
analysis creates the risk that tools regarded as fair and lawful in one jurisdiction may receive a conflicting 
interpretation in a different country. If this hypothesis is verified, we will be facing an unlevelled playing 
field, where there may be an advantage for criminals to target users of Member State where a lesser 
degree of protection if offered to citizens.  
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